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Abstract
In this paper, we show that distributed systems are vul-
nerable to routing attacks and propose an architecture to
obviate this vulnerability. A somewhat surprising finding is
that even a small-scale routing attack can completely dis-
rupt the operation of a state-machine replication service.
The architecture that we propose is based on the following
simple ideas: (1) Circumvent the adversary if possible and
(2) if it is not possible, relax the application semantics.
1 Introduction
Recent incidents (e.g., [2]) indicate that network-layer
attacks exploiting the routing protocol can be detrimental
for the availability of application-layer distributed software
systems. Such network-layer attacks can be performed from
peripheral autonomous systems through, for example, hi-
jacking the address space of the software service.1 There-
fore, it is natural to ask to what extent distributed systems
are vulnerable to these attacks and to what extent they can
be protected. Although it is true that a significant part of re-
search in distributed systems has been dedicated to making
these systems robust to failures, we obtain a perhaps sur-
prising result that the state-of-the-art techniques to ensure
robustness do not suffice to ensure the system’s availability.
A standard technique to achieve fault-tolerance in dis-
tributed systems is to replicate data and computation on
multiple locations so that, even if one or more replicas fail,
the system will be able to provide correct and continuous
service as long as enough replicas remain operational. In
this context, a lot of attention has been given to providing
robustness in the so-called Byzantine fault model [9], ac-
cording to which faulty replicas behave in an arbitrary fash-
ion. It would seem that a Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT)
system should also be robust against routing attacks. How-
ever, although a routing attack cannot violate the system’s
correctness, we show that it can easily prevent the system
from making progress. The reason can be traced to the
1This is what happened when Pakistan Telecom claimed to hold
YouTube servers (http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784 3-9878655-7.html),
which resulted in a more than two hours blackout of YouTube’s operation.
fact that existing BFT replication protocols (e.g., [5]) as-
sume that communication links are reliable (implying, for
instance, that every pair of correct replicas are able to com-
municate).
Having identified this threat, we present a system, which
we call RBFT (Robust BFT), that is designed to operate
against it. The system architecture is based on two simple
ideas: (1) Circumvent the adversary if possible, and (2) if
it is not possible, relax the application semantics. In this
paper, we investigate the robustness of this architecture us-
ing simulation (omitting the analytical results in the interest
of space). One of our findings is that network support be-
yond the scope of a software system’s application-specific
resources can be instrumental in improving robustness.
Related Work. Much previous work in defending against
routing attacks (e.g., [7]) has focused on network-wide
network-layer countermeasures. In this paper, we com-
bine more easily deployable network-layer countermea-
sures with application-layer ones.
Our countermeasures include overlay routing and any-
cast. Using overlays to overcome routing faults has been
explored in systems such as RON [3], Detour [10], and
ACR [12]. The ability of anycast to protect user access
to backbone DNS servers from routing attacks is evaluated
in [4]. In contrast, we are not only interested in protecting
the ability of users to access a general replicated system,
but also in the availability of the replica consistency pro-
tocol. Previous work in detecting routing attacks (such as
iSPY [13]) is in principle complementary to our approach.
Finally, the idea of relaxing the application semantics in
defending against routing attacks has not been explored be-
fore to the extent of our knowledge.
2 BFT is vulnerable to routing attacks
We consider a snapshot of the Internet’s autonomous-
system graph annotated with routing policies, taken from
CAIDA (www.caida.org), on which we simulate routing at-
tacks using the BSIM BGP simulator [1]. We select the
p participating nodes and the b attacking nodes at random
from the set of autonomous systems. In this setting, a neces-
sary (but not sufficient) condition for BFT to make progress
is the existence of a star, that is, a subgraph of the overlay
graph consisting of one overlay node connected to 2f other
nodes by bidirectionnal links that have not been hijacked,
where f < p=3 is the maximal number of faulty replicas
and p is the number of replicas.
Figure 1(a) measures the impact of an attack on the
replica overlay. Each point of the curves is the average
of 160 independent experiments. Our security performance
metric is the liveness ratio, defined as the percentage of ex-
periments in which the overlay contains a star. The empiri-
cal liveness ratio is shown as a function of b, for 10, 20 and
40 servers. For instance, the liveness ratio is lower than 20%
assuming b  4, independently of p. This clearly highlights
the significance of the threat as a system that consists of
40 = 3f + 1 replicas is expected to tolerate 13 = f Byzan-
tine replicas in the absence of routing attacks. Finally, note
that the availability benefit gained by increasing the number
of replicas is negligible.
3 RBFT Architecture
To overcome routing attacks, we try to ensure that clients
and servers have enough redundant paths to circumvent
the adversary through protocols designed for this purpose.
If this is not possible, the system gracefully degrades by
changing the application semantics.
3.1 Obtaining Path Diversity
In the Internet, every router selects at most one path for
each destination, and routing policies restrict what paths can
be selected. Moreover, applications do not typically partic-
ipate in the routing decisions. Therefore, the available de-
fault paths are rather restricted, and one of our challenges
is to improve path diversity. To that end, we rely on the
following methods. (1) We try to squeeze as many paths
as possible from a given system configuration (where by
configuration we mean a given placement of replicas to au-
tonomous systems). (2) We place the replicas strategically.
(3) We reconfigure the system dynamically by adapting the
number of replicas and their network location.
To squeeze paths from a given configuration, we rely on
two tricks. The first trick is to use overlay paths: if two
replicas cannot communicate directly, they try to communi-
cate through a one or more intermediate replicas. The sec-
ond trick is to expose the network provider’s path diversity
to the application. That is, if a provider has more than one
path to a particular (destination) replica, a (source) replica
being hosted at this provider’s network would be able to use
any of those paths.
The performance of a particular configuration against a
routing attack depends on both the number of autonomous
systems where replicas reside as well as the location and
role of those autonomous systems. For example, tier-1 au-
tonomous systems, which do not have providers, are able to
contribute significantly higher path diversity than stub (pe-
ripheral) autonomous systems, and it would be beneficial
for the robustness of the service to host its replicas inside
such a network. This intuition is verified in our simulations.
Finally, if the available path diversity is insufficient to
ensure progress, we change the system configuration by
adding, removing, and relocating replicas (leveraging the
cloud resources available in the Internet). Finding a new
configuration and making sure that the configuration is
properly adopted by the system in the presence of a rout-
ing attack can partly be a very interesting application for
ideas summarized in [8].
3.2 Exploiting the Path Diversity
Once redundant paths are available, carefully designed
protocols should be in place to circumvent the adversary.
We care about the communication between the replicas and
the clients as well as the communication among the replicas.
Client-to-Replica Paths. There are two aspects related
to protecting communication between the replicas and the
clients: making sure that the client requests reach the repli-
cas and making sure that the replica responses reach the
clients. We only discuss the second aspect (the techniques
for client-to-replica communication are similar).
In BFT, upon execution of a request, each replica for-
wards the corresponding response to the corresponding
client directly, and the client accepts the response if it re-
ceives identical responses from f + 1 replicas (one of them
should come from a correct replica). However, because of a
routing attack, the response may not reach the client. As a
result, the client may not receive f + 1 matching responses
to return the response to the application. To overcome this
issue, we require from each replica to broadcast its result to
the rest of the replicas, and as soon as each replica collects
f +1 distinct matching responses, it sends them back to the
client. As long as enough replicas are pairwise connected
(an assumption that we will revisit in the next section) and a
non-faulty path to the client exists, the client receives f +1
correct responses.
Replica-to-Replica Paths. In BFT, broadcast is the ba-
sic primitive of communication. Since a routing attack can
severely affect a significant number of direct paths in a naive
broadcast protocol, one method to exploit fault-free over-
lay paths is to rely on flooding: if a replica receives a mes-
sage m it has not seen before, it forwards m to every other
replica. The resulting protocol ensures progress that as long
as a quorum of correct replicas maintain a (eventually syn-
chronized) connected overlay.
To overcome the O(p2) message complexity of this ap-
proach, we require that flooding happens on a subgraph
of the replica overlay (that we will call the dissemination
graph). In the best case, this method employs O(p) trans-
missions per broadcast message (when the dissemination
graph is a tree), however, we may not be able to ensure de-
livery to all replicas that are connected by a fault-free path
to the source. In the following, we sketch a protocol that
approximates theO(p) complexity by adapting to the attack
and selecting the “best” dissemination graph.
At a high level, the protocol works by having replicas
adaptively decide on the dissemination graph using perfor-
mance feedback. The adaptation procedure is based on two
components: A performance monitor and a graph selection
algorithm. The performance monitor determines for each
request whether it was serviced successfully or not. The
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Figure 1. (a) Impact of a routing attack on BFT. (b) Effect of various defense strategies on the resilience of RBFT.
output of the performance monitor is fed to the dissemina-
tion graph selection algorithm, which is based on an online
learning algorithm, e.g., Hedge [6], that assigns to each can-
didate dissemination graph a probability and performs the
selection based on the resulting probability distribution.
3.3 Changing the Application Semantics
Another way of adapting to routing attacks is to trade off
the strong consistency properties of BFT for availability, ex-
tending the approach initiated by Zeno [11]. Roughly, each
group of f +1 correct replicas in the overlay resulting after
a routing attack would provide a weakly consistent BFT ser-
vice. Once a partition is repaired, the divergent views of the
distributed system state maintained by the components are
automatically merged in a common consistent view. Note
that, since Zeno only generalizes BFT’s semantics, it can
work in concert with the other parts of the system.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of RBFT
through simulations. We first measure to what extent
the replica overlay can resist the routing attack, assuming
that replica-to-replica communication proceeds over over-
lay paths. We use the setup of Section 2, i.e. a snapshot of
the real Internet topology and 40 replicas. We analyze the
security performance of RBFT when only overlay paths are
used (the baseline), and when two additional strategies for
enhancing RBFT are employed. The first additional strat-
egy, which we call PP (Priority Placement), places some of
the replicas at tier-1 AS nodes, i.e. at nodes that have no
provider. The second additional strategy, called AP (Alter-
nate Paths), further increases the path diversity, by allow-
ing replicas to use all alternate BGP paths visible to their
providers. Multipath is used here in an innocuous fashion
as these alternate paths are not readvertised into BGP.
Figure 1(b) shows the results of the simulation assum-
ing the replicas and the attackers are placed at random. The
relatively poor security performance of RBFT when only
overlay paths are used (BGP-baseline) is perhaps surpris-
ing. Also, adding tier-1 peers (the PP strategy) does not im-
prove the liveness ratio. The alternate-paths (AP) strategy
provides significant improvement. Moreover, when both
strategies are combined (PP+AP), the system exhibits sur-
prisingly high resilience, which suggests an additive power
of these strategies. One intuition for this is that tier-1 AS’es
are close to most servers, but also to many attackers. Allow-
ing them to change routes reveals all the potential of their
strategic placement.
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